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Brexit and the City 




The decision of British Citizens to vote for Brexit on the 23rd of June 2016 will pose a number of 
challenges to British institutions and the British capitalist system. This contribution explores how 
the institutional “pragmatic adaptation” of the City of London, relying on the friendly regulatory and 
economic policies enacted by the British government, will help the city of London adapt to the 
challenges of globalization and the changing nature of British relation with the EU. 
 
Introduction 
On June 23, 2016 British citizens finally voted for Brexit, opening new questions about what 
model will British capitalism be following in the future. 
If globalization did not pose any a real challenge to the City of London, Brexit might instead 
make it more difficult for the City to fully gather the benefits of financial globalization. Scholarly 
interventions have demonstrated that globalization could have indeed increased the bargaining 
power of the City inside the national polity, as its economic position is very likely to improve in the 
future thanks precisely to globalization. This will be the case no matter which definition of 
globalization we take into account, and regardless of whether the analysis is carried on at the macro 
or at the micro level.  
Starting from a quantitative definition of globalization, at the macro level this implies a trade-
off between national monetary autonomy and stable exchange rates. As exchange rate stability is 
necessary for trade liberalization, countries will need to renounce their macro-economic autonomy 
and integrate their monetary policy-making through global agreements and institutions.  
However, the decision by the UK government not to join the EMU demonstrates that, in the 
trade-off between the stability of the exchange rates and autonomous monetary policy, some 
countries, and especially some domestic actors (notably the City of London), might still prefer the 
latter. The reasons are many. Primarily, financial services have everything to gain from being able to 
set interest rates at a higher level than the other financial centres and to keep the level of domestic 
regulation under control as this represents a relevant competitive advantage in attracting short- and 
very short-term capital. Moreover, unstable exchange rates may and do actually signify a substantial 
source of revenues for the City of London. Finally, the City of London is most likely to be one of the 
main winners of financial speculative practices.  
From the micro point of view, when adopting a factorial approach globalization favours 
capitalists and skilled labour and therefore, undoubtedly the City of London. Furthermore, if an 
interest group is able to credibly threaten to leave the country, its bargaining power increases. As a 
consequence, globalization reduces the capacity of the government to disregard the preferences of 
the most mobile factor, which is capital and financial capital in particular, increasing the negotiation 
and political power of the owners of such capital: the City of London. 
Finally, adopting a sectoral instead of a factorial kind of analysis, to the extent to which the City 
remains competitive internationally, with a high degree of openness of the markets, it will improve 
its position not only with respect to labour but also with respect to industrial capital.  
From the qualitative point of view, around-the-clock access to financial markets all over the 
globe does not threaten the geographical allocation of financial power. This remained surprisingly 
stable and concentrated in three centres: New York, London and, to a more limited extent, Tokyo. 
This concentration is unparalleled in any other kind of industry and it is also extremely durable. 
London is the most successful of these centres and its position has certainly been strengthened by its 
ability to attract expertise and highly valuable skills from all over the globe, including the EU. This 
resulted in a virtuous circle, which made London more and more attractive to highly skilled labour 
and this, in turn, favoured the concentration of financial services in the British capital. Brexit most 
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likely will revert this dynamics making London less attractive to highly skilled labour from the EU 
and thus also limiting the concentration of expertise and knowledge, which represents such a 
valuable competitive advantage for the City of London. 
Moreover, Brexit can offset also other benefits of globalization, as it will undermine the ability 
of the City to have full access to EU markets without discrimination. This would be particularly true 
if the EU decides to go ahead with the Capital Markets Union, not only because the City is unlikely to 
be allowed to take part in it, but also because not being in the EU could mean the imposition of 
barriers to the free movement of capital outside the EU. 
If it is true, as the analysis below will show, that the City thrives on the liberalization of 
financial markets, having barriers imposed by the EU as a consequence of Brexit would represent a 
major blow on the hegemonic position of the City in the international context. 
Moreover, it remains to be seen if a stand-alone UK will be able to negotiate the same trade 
conditions as the EU when it comes to international trade agreements such as, for example TITP.  
Maybe, at this point, the pragmatic adaptation, relaying uniquely on the power of the Bank of 
England and the HM Treasury, will not be enough to guarantee the best possible treatment to the 
British financial sector internationally.  
In the next section we will explore how this “pragmatic adaptation”, relying on the friendly 
regulatory and economic policies enacted by the British government, has helped the City’s revival 
and ultimate success in the period before and after the Global Financial crisis. 
Pragmatic adaptation and the success of the City of London before and after 
the Global Financial Crisis  
Within the context of “pragmatic adaptation”, this section reviews British economic policy 
making between before and after the Global Financial crisis to verify to what extent the City’s 
special relation with the Bank of England and the Treasury confirmed and enhanced the 
hegemonic position of the City of London within the British capitalist structure as well as globally. 
This section will try to assess whether the financial crisis that hit the global economy 
unexpectedly in August 2007, producing consequences comparable to the ones experienced in the 
course of the 1930s, has put under discussion the hegemonic position of the City of London in the 
domestic and international context. 
It is not here the place to address the theories relating to the causes and consequences of the 
Global Financial Crisis (Talani 2010). It is worth noting, however, that the crisis, although 
originating from the U.S. housing and mortgaging markets, found very fertile ground in the 
uncontrolled possibility of the financial markets to develop and sell new financial instruments that 
allowed the banking sector to greatly expand their capacity to extend loans and provide mortgages 
even to the least solvent clients. Therefore, the idea that finance was doomed after the crisis was very 
widespread (Bishop 2009). 
In the U.K. in particular, it was felt that the financial sector could not be the main 
specialization of Britain any longer; the country will have to find a new one. Many British analysts, in 
the immediate aftermath of the global financial crisis insisted on the changes that the global 
financial crisis would have not only on the British economic strategy, but more importantly on the 
structure of the British economy itself. It seemed almost inevitable that the role of the financial 
sector would decline, although it did not clearly emerge what would take its place. Further, the 
centrality of the City of London as the “European” financial capital or as a global financial power was 
felt to have been put in danger by the crisis. This led economists and commentators to identify as a 
solution joining the Euro-area. However surreal it may seem in light of the recent developments of 
the Euro-zone’s sovereign-debt crisis, the case for the U.K. joining the EMU had never been as 
pressing as at the start of the global financial crisis. Leading scholars and public opinion-makers in 
the U.K. joined the debate promoting accession on various occasions (Bishop et al., 2009).  
However, in December 2010 the financial and economic situation in Europe and especially in 
the Euro-area was still heavily compromised. The main problems existed in the interplay between 
sovereign debt difficulties and the weakness of the banking sectors in some countries within the 
Euro-area. Taken together, these issues could bring serious consequences for the sustainability of 
the EMU as a whole.  
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At the end of 2010, it seemed that the shelter provided by the Euro and by the ECB against the 
worst consequences of the global financial and economic crisis had failed to work its magic. This 
made the British government feel good about having decided to ignore the calls to join the EMU 
which had been voiced in many sectors at the very beginning of the financial turmoil. 
But what was the impact of the crisis on the City of London? Lord Adair Turner, the Financial 
Service Authority chairman, during the tragic week of October 2008 told The Guardian that the days 
of soft-touch regulation were over, warning the City that higher-paid regulators would ask tougher 
questions in the wake of the credit crisis. However, by now it is clear that the consequences of the 
crisis have been felt mainly by the workers of the British and the global financial sector. The ILO 
estimates total announced layoffs of 325,000 between August 2007 and February 2009 (ILO 
2009:14). This figure underestimates the real number of jobs lost given that not all institutions 
announced their employment decisions in advance; in addition, it does not include independent 
mortgage brokers, other independent contractors, or the myriad of small financial firms which 
were likely to disappear as a consequence of the crisis.  
Furthermore, it seems clear that the loss of jobs experienced by the City of London parallels 
similar layoffs in all the other major financial centers. This means that the position of the City of 
London as one of the most important global financial players does not seem to have been put under 
discussion. Moreover, much of the restructuring which led to the rationalization of the workforce, 
including some nationalizations, was the result of consolidations based on mergers and acquisitions 
which actually enhanced the overall importance of the financial sector globally and within the UK. 
Indeed, there is no evidence that the City of London lost its market share and leadership in the 
European financial sector. 
To prove this point it is enough to look at the data in the figure below. In 2014, the City was 
contending the primacy of financial markets and activities only with New York. Moreover, the 
outlook for many of those markets and activities had actually improved after 2008. This was the 
case, for example, for the foreign exchange turnover, for OTC derivatives turnover, for marine 
insurance and premium income, and for private equity investment. 
 
Figure Error! No text of specified style in document.-1 Financial markets share by country 





Moreover, the City was actually able to cash on the global financial crisis. For example, 
unstable exchange rates may and do actually represent a substantial source of revenue for the City of 
London. Indeed, the volume of foreign exchange trading surged to record levels at the outset of the 
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credit crisis as rate cutting from central banks and high volatility in exchange rates  (Fig. below) 
caused a flight from emerging market currencies to “safe-haven” currencies such as the US dollar 
(IFSL 2009).  
Figure -2: Exchange rate volatility since the start of the credit crisis 
 
Source: IFSL 2009 
 
Global bank revenues from foreign exchange trading benefited from relatively strong trading 
volumes since the start of the credit crisis and from higher commissions that resulted from a 
widening of foreign exchange trading spreads. The UK was the main geographic centre for foreign 
exchange trading with nearly 36% of the global total in April 2009. Average daily turnover on the 
UK’s foreign exchange market totalled $1,269 billion in April 2009, with a further $81 billion traded 
in currency derivatives (IFSL 2009). In the UK, the share of the largest 10 institutions rose from 61% 
to 70% between 2004 and 2007, continuing the trend from the 1998 and 2001 survey. Needless to 
say, London was the centre for foreign exchange trading (see below).  
Figure Error! No text of specified style in document.-3 Concentration of Foreign 




Overall, the City not only survived the blow but it could be argued that it turned it at its 
advantage.  
There is, however, the possibility that things can get worse for London as a financial centre. A 
threat that the circumstances that have allowed London to thrive in the last few decades may be put 
under discussion through a radical tightening of financial service regulation. The success of the City 
of London has always been determined by its ability to adapt to the changing environment. 
Therefore, in the absence of regulatory constraints, its markets and institutions will certainly be able 
to react to any changing situation. However, it is precisely this capacity to change quickly and react 
to the changing global environment that could be put under discussion by adopting strict financial 
markets and banking sector regulation, including the minimal regulatory requirements connected to 
entry of the UK into the EMU.  
Will this happen? 
The need for global economic governance of the banking and financial sector has been 
advocated in a number of international forums. In the U.S., the Obama administration scored an 
unexpected victory in favor of more regulation with the passing of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act in July 2010. At the European level, however, to date there is 
nothing like a pan-European regulatory regime for the EU and Euro-area banking and financial 
systems.  
The transformation of the existing European supervisory committees on January 1, 2011 into 
the European Banking Authority (EBA) based in London, and the establishment of the European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in Paris and of the European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) in Frankfurt to create the new European Supervisory 
Authorities (ESAs) to be inserted in the European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) does not 
seem to address the issue substantially. National authorities remain responsible for the day-to-day 
supervision of individual firms, with the new European architecture only providing an overarching 
European framework for financial supervision1. 
Even after the global financial crisis, the restructuring of the European supervisory 
architecture, and the partial creation of the European Banking Union, in the EU and Euro-area, 
banking and financial supervision remains predominantly in the hands of the national central banks.  
Even more importantly, in the new British regulatory environment, following the events of 
October 2008, controls are still in the hands of the Bank of England especially after the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer of the newly elected coalition Government announced the abolition of the FSA. Thus 
the new system, retains the in-house structure of control for the City of London and banking 
supervision.  So which are the challenges that the City of London will have to face in the future? 
This is the subject of the following section of this contribution. 
Globalisation and the future of the City of London inside or outside the EU 
Globalization is one of the most hotly debated topics within the social sciences, and certainly 
one that has captured our imagination when looking toward the future. Globalization is not only the 
present, but also the future of politics and economics, and no discussion regarding future scenarios 
can avoid addressing it.  
How will globalization affect the future of the City of London? Will financial globalization 
signal the end of the City’s hegemony or will it guarantee its future success?  
 Questions related to how globalization affects domestic actors cannot be disentangled from a 
more general and in-depth analysis of globalization and its definitions. 
The notion of globalization is not without controversy both within the academic debate and in 
the wider public discourse. Despite the great success of this concept in recent decades there is still 
some degree of confusion about its definition, and the discussion is still open about precisely how 
globalization modifies the capacity of the state to intervene in the domestic and in the global 
economy (Busch 2008:5). 
                                                 
1 For more details see http://www.consilium.Europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/117747.pdf 
as accessed on December 21, 2010. 
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However, it is possible to classify positions adopted by scholars into three broad groups, 
alongside the three traditional approaches to International Relations/International Political 
Economy (IR/IPE) (Dicken 1999:5): First, those who deny outright the very existence of the 
phenomenon of globalization (Hirst et al. 1999a; 1999b; Thompson 1993); second, those who 
recognize it but tend to give only a quantitative definition of globalization (Held et al. 2000; Holm et 
al 1995:3) third, those who adopt a qualitative definition (Mittlemann 2000; Hay et al. 2000; Dicken 
1999;2003). 
In this section, we shall deal with each of these approaches to the definition of globalization 
and their consequences for the future of the City of London both inside and outside the EU. 
Let us start from a classical quantitative view of financial globalization. This has been well 
summarized by Cohen (1996): 
 
“Financial globalization (or internationalization) refers to the broad integration of national 
markets associated with both innovation and deregulation in the postwar era and is manifested by 
increasing movements of capital across national frontiers. The more alternative assets are closely 
regarded as substitutes for one another, the higher the degree of capital mobility” (Cohen 1996:269). 
 
Adopting this definition, capital mobility becomes the constituent element of financial 
globalization (Obstfeld et al. 2004). In macroeconomic terms, the problem is called the “inconsistent 
quartet” (Padoa-Schioppa 1994), the “unholy trinity”’ (Cohen 1996) or the “trilemma” (Obstefeld et 
al. 2004:29), and posits that in an economic environment characterized by free capital movement, 
national monetary autonomy becomes an alternative to keeping stable exchange rates. The case rests 
on the argument that complete capital liberalization, (as implied by the quantitative definition of 
financial globalization) and exchange rate stability, (as necessary, in theory, for international trade 
to continue unhindered) are incompatible with divergent national monetary policies.  
Although in macroeconomic terms this argument is certainly sound (or, at the least I am not in 
a position to criticize it), the British case is particularly relevant in highlighting how financial 
globalization did not particularly decrease the power of the City of London as defined here. The main 
point is that in the trade-off between the stability of exchange rates and autonomous monetary 
policy, some domestic actors (notably the City of London) might still prefer the latter, as they have 
demonstrated in their position toward joining the Euro area (Talani 2010). This happens for some 
concurring reasons.  
Some sectors, like financial services, though perfectly integrated at the regional level might still 
prefer to keep autonomous monetary policy decision-making at the national level. In particular, 
setting the interest rates at a higher level than other financial centers represents a relevant 
competitive advantage in attracting short- and very short-term capital. This, of course, is harmful for 
industrial activity. However, here the issue becomes one of power relations between domestic 
economic sectors or interest groups.  In the context of globalization, the issue is also influenced by 
the extent to which the industrial sector is actually relying on domestic production as opposed to 
production abroad (Dicken 2003).  
To conclude the discussion of how the British financial sector will gain from globalization at the 
macro level, it is not unlikely that London will be on the winning side of speculative practices (Guth 
1994; Lilley 2000). Following is just one example: In 2008, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) 
was compelled to pass emergency rules banning the short-selling2 of UK bank shares in the City of 
London after the practice brought the HBOS share price to a collapse3. Well-known City operators 
are believed to have profited from short-selling sub-prime mortgages and betting against HBOS4. 
Hedge funds in the City of London are said to have made at least £1 billion in profits by shorting 
HBOS shares in June and July 2008, fuelled by City rumors that the bank was in financial distress. 
At one point in June of that year, a single fund, Harbinger Capital, traded more than three per cent 
                                                 
2 Short-selling is selling borrowed shares in the hopes that their price will fall and that they can be bought back at a 
profit later on. 
3 The ban was then lifted in January 2009 
4 See Guardian, various issues. 
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of all HBOS shares, and is said to have made more than £280 from shorting the bank.  Harbinger 
was run by Philip Falcone, a former Barclays trader who earned £1.7 billion in 2007 alone5.  
It is, however, at the micro level (i.e. at the level of sectoral and domestic interest group 
analysis) that we see how the City of London can gain from globalization.  
As Cohen correctly states, ”owners of mobile capital thus gain influence at the expense of less 
fortunate sectors including so-called national capital as well as labor” (Cohen 1996:286). 
 How does this happen? To answer this question, it is necessary to adopt a domestic politics (or 
inside-out) approach to the international political economy.  
Assuming that globalization is defined in quantitative terms as “growing global trade and 
financial flows” (Frieden and Rogowski 1996: 26), by applying the Heckscher-Ohlin/Stolper-
Samuelson approach, it is possible to derive some interesting propositions about the distributional 
consequences of globalization. This would imply a rise in the domestic prices of goods whose 
production is intensive in the given country’s abundant factors and a fall in the prices of those goods 
intensive in scarce factors. In this context, globalization would benefit the owners of abundant 
factors and disadvantage those who own scarce factors (Frieden and Rogowski 1996: 37). Therefore, 
as developed countries are characterized by an abundance of capital and a shortage of unskilled 
labor, globalization favors capitalists and skilled labor while unskilled labor is at a disadvantage. 
(Frieden and Rogowski 1996: 40). This is relevant for our domestic politics analysis of who wins and 
who loses from globalization as the City of London is composed exclusively by capitalist and skilled 
labor and has everything to gain from liberalization from this perspective.  
There are, however, two further dimensions that strengthen the argument that the City of 
London will certainly gain from globalization. First, we must consider that on the basis of this 
analysis, the power of an interest group to assert its preferences is directly related to its capacity to 
move, which in turn depends on the mobility of its factor. If an interest group is able to credibly 
threaten leaving the country, its bargaining power increases. Therefore, globalization reduces the 
capacity of the government to disregard the preferences of the most mobile factor, which is capital—
and financial capital in particular— and increases the negotiation and political power of the owners 
of such capital: to wit, the City of London (Kehoane et al 1996:19; Busch 2008:8). 
Moreover, adopting a sectoral rather than a factorial type of analysis, through the application 
of the specific factors approach (also known as Ricardo-Viner) the result is even more clearly 
supportive of the view that the British banking sector has everything to gain from globalization 
(Frieden and Rogowski 1996: 38). 
This perspective suggests that factors like land, labor or capital are normally used for a specific 
activity or production, and therefore only price changes in their specific activity or production (not in 
all of the uses of the factors) will affect them. To apply it to the case of the UK, if capital is used 
specifically for banking and financial transactions when the terms of trade in banking change, only 
the banking sector will gain, not all capital. Overall, the application of the Ricardo-Viner variant 
implies: 
 
1) That the benefits of globalization will vary with the specificity of the relevant actors’ 
assets 
2) That the most competitive sectors will gain more 
3) That political pressure will happen at the sectoral rather than at the factorial level. 
 
There is no doubt that financial capital is an abundant factor in the UK. Therefore, to the extent 
to which the City remains competitive internationally, and a high degree of openness is guaranteed, 
it will improve its position not only with respect to labor but also, more importantly given the 
approach adopted here, with respect to industrial capital.  
Let us now address the question from the perspective of a qualitative definition of 
globalization. As detailed above, technological change is at the core of the qualitative definition of 
globalization, bringing about changes in the productive and in the financial sphere (Dicken, 
2003:85).  
                                                 
5 See The Telegraph, web-site http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/2977387/Protect-bank-shares-from-short-
selling-ministers-told.html as accessed on June 28, 2010. 
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It is technology, therefore, that produces financial globalization, defined here as the existence 
of around-the-clock access to financial transactions all over the world (Dicken 2003: 443). 
Susan Strange identified the three most important technological changes that have produced 
financial globalization: computers, chips and satellites (Strange 1998: 24-26): 
 
“Computers have made money electronic…by the mid-1990s computers had not only 
transformed the physical form in which money worked as a medium of exchange, they were also in 
the process of transforming the systems by which payments of money were exchanged and recorded” 
(Strange 1998: 24).  
 
Chips (microprocessors) have allowed for the credit card revolution and will soon allow for a 
“smart card” revolution as well (Cohen 2001). Finally, satellites are the basis of global electronic 
communication (Dicken 2003:85-120). 
It is impossible not to understand the implications on financial services in terms of increase in 
productivity; patterns of relationships and linkages between financial firms and clients, and within 
the financial community; velocity and turnover of investment capital and capacity to react to 
international events immediately (Dicken 2003:443). 
But does this also mean that the physical location of financial markets loses significance or that 
financial elites become disentangled from national boundaries?  
There is some consensus in the literature that financial globalization has “made geography 
more, not less, important” (Dicken 2003:59) (Coleman 1996:7). On the one hand, some financial 
products contain information which is the result of long, well-established business relationships and 
this remains the case with financial globalization. Equities, domestic bonds and bank loans have 
indeed a large amount of domestic information embedded within (Coleman 1996:7).  
Most importantly, however, it is worth noting that despite the significant emphasis on financial 
globalization, the location of global financial power has remained surprisingly unchanged and 
concentrated in a handful of urban centers, namely New York, London and, to a more limited extent, 
Tokyo. This concentration is unparalleled in any other kind of industry and it is also extremely stable 
(Dicken 2003: 462). 
In fact, London is the more broadly based financial center and its position does not seem to 
have changed in the last decade—the decade of globalization. If anything, with respect to many of its 
main markets and services, its position has improved.  
However, if openness is reduced, as, for example, by closing the European single market to the 
UK as a consequence of a Brexit, all the advantages of globalisation are likely to be off-set.  
All the above might explain why the City of London was against a Brexit. The City of London 
Corporation has openly supported Britain remaining in the EU. 
A survey of 147 UK based financial services firms found 40% chose the UK over other centres 
because of access to the EU. 81% of 98 fintech start-up business published by Innovate Finance, 
voted to stay in the EU, this was comparable to the survey conducted by Tech London Advocates in 
20156.  
Not a single financial trade association has been favourable to Brexit, and the representatives 
of major City institutions such as Lloyds of London, the London Stock Exchange, Aviva, Goldman 
Sachs, HSBC, Barclays, Prudential, RSA, Standard Life and Santander have all expressed their 
institutions’ wish that Britain will decide to remain in the EU. The reasons have been perfectly 
illustrated by JP Morgan. If the UK stays in the Single Market, the institutions based in the City have 
a passport to operate everywhere else in the EU without the need to have separate businesses in 
other countries, with all that this means in terms of different authorisation processes, regulation as 
well as staffing costs. For example, of the 20,000 staff JP Morgan has in the European Union, 
19,000 are in the United Kingdom, mainly in London, but also in Bournemouth and Glasgow7.  
                                                 
6 See https://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/about-the-city/how-we-make-decisions/Documents/implementing-markets-
union.pdf as accessed on April 28, 2016. 
7 See https://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/about-the-city/how-we-make-decisions/Documents/implementing-markets-
union.pdf as accessed on April 28, 2016. 
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Conclusion 
Summing up, what really counts for the prosperity of the City is a relaxed regulatory 
environment, which, of course can be guaranteed by a Brexit. However this is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for the City to maintain its hegemony both domestically and internationally in 
the globalization era. The second, vital condition is open access to markets globally, but also within 
the EU. This can be easily jeopardised by a Brexit as it is highly unlikely the EU will grant the UK 
similar conditions of access to its markets as if it were still a member of the club. However this can, 
maybe, be a matter of negotiation of the exit terms. 
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